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Abstract 
This paper studies the current state and drivers of government local currency bond market 
(LCBM) development in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that well-developed government 
LCBMs could reduce countries’ exposure to external shocks; help overcome ‘original sin’; 
facilitate domestic savings mobilisation; and may have important financial, macroeconomic 
and institutional spill-overs. With detailed information collected from various sources the 
paper first shows that quite a few African countries have made significant progress in 
developing LCBMs. Increasingly, African governments issue fixed-rate local currency bonds 
with tenors of ten years and more on a regular basis. However, we also find that LCBMs in 
Africa often have low liquidity, feature very few corporate securities and generally have 
relatively narrow investor bases dominated by commercial banks. The second part of the 
study presents an econometric analysis of the drivers of African government LCBMs based on 
a new high-quality panel dataset compiled by the OECD. Our results indicate that LCBM 
capitalisation is correlated negatively with governments’ fiscal balance and inflation, and 
positively with common law legal origins, institutional quality and strong democratic political 
systems.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Concerns about financial stability associated with the external financing of developing 
countries have led to a renewed interest in the development of their domestic capital markets. 
Most notably, in November 2011 the G20 endorsed an action plan to support the development 
of local currency bond markets (LCBMs) in emerging markets and other developing 
economies and called upon international organisations to cooperate in data collection and 
analytical work on LCBMs.1 This resulted in a joint ‘diagnostic framework’ (IMF, World 
Bank, EBRD and OECD 2013), a toolkit designed to help country authorities analyse the state 
of their LCBMs and identify reform priorities. 
This paper focuses on government LCBMs in Sub-Saharan Africa more specifically, 
long time a blind spot in bond market research; mostly due to its relative underdevelopment 
and a lack of reliable, comparable data. Only very recently a number of studies have analysed 
African LCBMs (Blommestein and Horman 2007; Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak 2009; Mu et 
al. 2013).  
At least four important reasons can be distinguished for the further development of 
liquid LCBMs in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, the global financial crisis and its spill-overs have 
demonstrated that developing economies, in Africa and elsewhere, remain vulnerable to 
external shocks, including sudden stops in private capital flows (Essers 2013). Moreover, 
developing countries may face a more limited availability of official, concessional finance in 
the (near) future (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; Dang et al. 2013). This would especially affect 
aid-dependent African countries. Well-developed LCBMs, with a broad local investor base, 
would reduce countries’ exposure to external finance shocks, acting as a ‘spare tyre’ that 
stabilises the domestic economy (Anderson et al. 2011; Turner 2012). 
Second, developing economies have traditionally not been able to borrow in their local 
currency from abroad or even domestically (except with ultra-short maturities), a 
phenomenon known as ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999; see Khan 2005 on 
Africa). Original sin often leads to severe currency mismatches, with destabilising effects in 
case of real exchange rate pressure (Goldstein and Turner 2004; Eichengreen et al. 2005). 
LCBM development has the potential to reduce original sin by changing debt denomination 
from predominantly foreign to local currencies; by lengthening maturities; and by attracting 
non-resident investors to buy longer-term local currency bonds (Essers and Cassimon 2012). 
Third, Sub-Saharan Africa is in urgent need of additional funds for growth-enhancing 
investment, notably in infrastructure (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010; OECD 2012). Part 
of the funding needs could be fulfilled using government and corporate infrastructure project 
bonds (Mbeng Mezui and Hundal 2013). More generally, LCBMs could help mobilising 
Africa’s domestic savings by improving financial intermediation, discouraging capital flight 
and even encouraging capital to return; much of Africa’s private wealth has traditionally been 
held abroad, making the region a net capital exporter to the rest of the world (Collier et al. 
2001; Ndikumana and Boyce 2011).  
Fourth, the process of government LCBM development in particular has positive spill-
over effects. These include boosting broader financial market development, as government 
bonds fulfil the role of ‘safe asset’ in the domestic economy and of pricing benchmark; 
encouraging sounder macroeconomic and monetary policy, as governments are forced to put 
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their house in order and central banks use government securities in their open-market 
transactions; and furthering institutional quality, as LCBMs require a strong legal framework 
and may contribute to building governments’ domestic accountability (World Bank and IMF 
2001; Kumhof and Tanner 2005; Abbas and Christensen 2010; IMF et al. 2013; Mu et al. 
2013; Laeven 2014). 
LCBMs are no panacea however. Especially in their initial stages of development, 
government LCBMs could potentially even crowd out private sector credit (Christensen 2005; 
Mbate 2013). Large holdings of government bonds by domestic banks may reduce their 
efficiency and shrink their private sector loan portfolios (Emran and Farazi 2009; Hauner 
2009; Ismihan and Ozkan 2012). It has also been noted that debt service costs and 
refinancing/interest rate risks on local currency bonds are higher when compared with non-
market funding such as concessional bilateral and multilateral loans (Beaugrand et al. 2002; 
Christensen 2005; Hanson 2007). The optimal public debt structure is one that balances 
important trade-offs: local vs. hard currency, domestic vs. external creditors, short vs. long 
maturities, and nominal vs. price-indexed debt (Blommestein 2005; Panizza 2008, 2010). As 
in advanced and emerging economies, African government LCBM development should 
ultimately be part of a broader, risk-based public debt management strategy (Blommestein 
2005; Blommestein and Santiso 2007). 
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature on government LCBMs in Sub-
Saharan Africa is threefold. First, bringing together cross-country information that was hand-
collected from various sources, we present a detailed account of the current state of African 
government LCBMs. This large cross-country overview features several LCBM indicators 
that are absent from previous work (e.g., Bua et al. 2014), including bond tenors, common 
bond coupon types and bond auction frequency. We find that several African governments 
now issue fixed-rate local currency bonds with tenors of ten years and more on a regular 
basis, but also uncover that African LCBMs are generally marked by low secondary market 
liquidity, narrow investor bases dominated by commercial banks, and few corporate 
securities. 
Second, we introduce a new high-quality panel dataset, compiled by the OECD 
(2013), that covers central government debt in 15 selected Sub-Saharan African countries 
over the period 2003-2012. This dataset was sourced directly from African debt management 
offices through circulation of a standardised questionnaire, unlike in other papers that tend to 
mix primary and secondary data (e.g., Mu et al. 2013; Bua et al. 2014), hence allowing us to 
construct a fully comparable and consistent measure of government LCBM capitalisation, i.e., 
local currency marketable central government debt as a percentage of GDP. Our set of sample 
countries is small but more diverse than the group of African low-income countries on which 
Bua et al. (2014) present detailed debt structure data, which makes for interesting between-
country comparisons. 
Third, the current paper is the first to conduct an econometric analysis of the drivers of 
government LCBM capitalisation in Africa based on this alternative OECD dataset and 
complements and extends earlier work. For example, we include in our analysis explanatory 
variables such as inflation, democracy and other government debt stock, which have been 
ignored in comparable studies on Africa (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak 2009; Mu et al. 
2013), and perform a battery of additional robustness tests. Our key findings are that, on 
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average, government LCBM capitalisation is larger in African countries with lower fiscal 
balances, lower inflation, common law legal origins, higher institutional quality and stronger 
democratic political systems. Controlling for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity and 
persistence  LCBM development, we find above all that a worsening fiscal balance and 
declining inflation are associated with increases in government LCBM capitalisation. 
 
 
2. Taking stock: Sub-Saharan Africa’s government LCBMs in perspective  
 
2.1. Domestic vs. external public debt 
 
To place government LCBMs in a broader perspective, it is useful to first distinguish between 
domestic and external public debt. Panizza (2008) identifies three possible ways to make this 
distinction: based on the currency of the debt; based on creditor residency; or based on the 
place of issuance and legislation governing the debt contract. The second definition of 
domestic and external public debt is analytically most correct, but difficult to apply in practice 
with respect to bonded debt, since it requires periodic surveys to identify the ultimate bond 
holders. That is why, typically, the third method, and in some instances the first method, are 
used as more feasible alternative taxonomies (see e.g., IMF and IDA 2013). 
 Figure 1 shows the historical evolution of (unweighted) average domestic and external 
public debt as a percentage of GDP, for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa and separately for 
countries that have benefitted from the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative 
(since 1996) and its successor, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), and non-HIPCs 
(see Essers and Cassimon 2012). It is clear that, largely due to external debt relief under HIPC 
and MDRI, total public debt ratios have come down dramatically since 2000 and domestic 
public debt now constitutes an important part, around 40%, of African public debt stocks. On 
average, the build-up of domestic public debt by African non-HIPCs was larger than by 
HIPCs. But also HIPCs tapped domestic markets, allegedly since they were limited in their 
non-concessional external borrowing as part of IMF programmes (Arnone and Presbitero 
2010).  
Importantly, not all domestic public debt reported in Figure 1 consists of (longer-
tenor) government bonds denominated in local currency. According to the definitions applied 
by international organisations that collect data on domestic public debt, it may include a 
whole range of financial liabilities, including (but not limited to) securities such as bonds, 
notes, bills and commercial paper; currency and deposits; insurance technical reserves; 
financial derivatives; and other accounts payable, such as trade credits and central bank 
advances (see BIS, Commonwealth Secretariat, ECB, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, Paris Club, 
UNCTAD, and World Bank 2013). This in turn means that the above-mentioned benefits of 
government LCBMs do not automatically materialise in countries with large domestic public 
debt, and that narrower measures are needed to gain further insights into domestic public 
debt’s potential and vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of average domestic and external public debt (as % of GDP) in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 1980-2010 
 
Notes: historical averages are from Christensen (2005); 2005/2010 figures from IMF Country Reports. Data are for most countries limited to 
central government debt, but sometimes include state and local governments and/or public company debt. Domestic-external debt 
classification is, in most cases, based on place of issuance. Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and South 
Sudan are excluded for data availability reasons. 
 
 
Ideally, one would decompose overall domestic public debt figures, not only by type of 
instrument, but also by currency, maturity and creditor type. Such detailed information is, 
however, not systematically available for a larger sample of African countries; although some 
useful information exists (see Presbitero 2012). For a sample of African HIPCs, Arnone and 
Presbitero (2010) show that between 1994 and 2003 the growing domestic public debt stock 
was strongly biased towards short-term instruments (mainly treasury bills), suggesting that 
external public debt’s currency mismatches were initially replaced by domestic public debt’s 
maturity mismatches (Christensen 2005). Using 1996-2011 data on 15 low-income countries 
(of which ten are Sub-Saharan African), Bua et al. (2014) find that central bank advances are 
still an important category of domestic public debt (especially in HIPCs), although the share 
of longer-term marketable securities such as bonds has grown over time. 
 
2.2. Current state of government LCBMs 
 
In the remainder of the paper we focus on one particular subcategory of domestic public debt, 
i.e., local currency marketable central government debt (or government LCBMs in short), 
irrespective of the residency of creditors or place of issuance.2 Table 1 presents information 
on a number of fairly detailed quantitative and qualitative government LCBM indicators for 
selected Sub-Saharan African countries, to which we have added as an appendage one column 
on corporate LCBM capitalisation. These cross-sectional data represent the most up-to-date 
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cross-checked information we were able to collect from various sources, primarily OECD 
(2013), Mu et al. (2013), the African Development Bank’s AFMI website, Standard Chartered 
Bank’s Local Market Compendium 2014 and Ecobank’s Middle Africa Market Update. To 
our knowledge, these detailed indicators are not available in panel data format (apart from 
LCBM capitalisation figures, see below). Table 1, although uneven in terms of data coverage, 
gives some idea of the various stages of government LCBM development countries in the 
region have attained.3  
South Africa’s government LCBM is by far the largest and most developed in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In relative terms (as a percentage of GDP), its outstanding central government 
marketable debt is only surpassed by tiny Mauritius and Eritrea (a country that only issues 
treasury bills). Other relatively large government LCBMs are those of Kenya, Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Malawi and Nigeria.4 Also Zambia, Uganda, Namibia and Tanzania had central 
government marketable debt stocks in excess of 10% of GDP in 2012. 
Note that quite a few African governments are now able to issue domestic longer-term 
bonds in local currency. In addition to South Africa, also Kenya, Namibia and Nigeria have 
successfully issued bonds with original maturities of 20 years or more; Botswana, Mauritius, 
Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland and a number of former HIPCs (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Ethiopia and Mozambique) have issued bonds with tenors of at least ten years. Many of these 
governments have concrete plans to issue local currency debt with even longer maturities, 
thereby reducing original sin in Sub-Saharan Africa (Essers and Cassimon 2012). 
Another notable feature is that most government bonds have fixed-rate coupons. But 
there are exceptions, such as Angola, where issues also include bonds denominated in and 
indexed to foreign currency as well as inflation-indexed local currency bonds (OECD 2013). 
About two thirds of the African countries listed in Table 1 publish an official bond auction 
calendar and hold government bond auctions at least quarterly; several among them hold such 
auctions even monthly. Half of the counties have primary dealer systems in place. 
In spite of these developments, which have resulted in an expansion of African 
LCBMs, important policy challenges remain. Liquidity in most African LCBMs remains 
shallow, concentrated in government debt instruments of a handful of countries (particularly 
South Africa and Nigeria). Corporate LCBMs are at an early stage of development and even 
more illiquid than government LCBMs.5 Only in South Africa there is currently a vibrant 
corporate LCBM segment. Ojah and Pillay (2009) show that firms using South Africa’s 
LCBM are typically larger, longer-established, more profitable and less opaque than firms 
that borrow privately from bank and non-bank debt providers. Other African corporate 
LCBMs are starting to grow, but from a very low base (Mu et al. 2013). Activity is driven by 
relatively few issuers, mostly parastatals and commercial banks. 
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Table 1. Government LCBM indicators for selected Sub-Saharan African countries 
 
  Central government LCBMs                 Corporate LCBMs 
Country 
Capitalisation 
of marketable 
debt, % of GDP 
(year) 
Full bond 
tenor span 
Common 
bond tenors 
Common bond 
coupon types 
Published 
bond 
auction 
calendar / 
auction 
frequency 
Primary 
dealer 
system 
Main resident investors Foreign investors 
Restrictions on 
foreign investment 
Bid-ask 
spread on 
secondary 
market (year) 
Capitalisation, % 
of GDP (year) 
Angola 7.8 (2012) 1Y-12Y 1Y-6Y 
pre-determined / 
fixed; indexed; 
foreign currency 
Yes / weekly No 
mainly commercial banks; also 
institutional investors (pension funds and  
insurance companies), central bank, and 
mining and oil companies 
negligible Yes, strict exchange 
controls 
no active 
secondary 
market 
no corporate bond 
market 
Botswana 3.7 (2010) 2Y-15Y 
existing 
bond issues 
tapped at 
auction 
fixed; floating No / de facto half-yearly Yes 
mainly institutional investors (insurance 
companies and pension funds); also 
commercial banks and central bank 
negligible Yes, only up to 20% 
of bonds issued 20bps (2013) 3.1 (2010) 
Burundi 2.2 (2008) 2Y-5Y N/A N/A No / ad hoc No mainly local commercial banks (65% in 2011); also institutional investors negligible No 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
no corporate bond 
market 
Eritrea 45.5 (2010) only bills none none No / none No N/A N/A N/A no secondary 
market 
no corporate bond 
market 
Ethiopia 20.6 (2009) 5Y-10Y N/A fixed; floating; foreign currency No / ad hoc No 
commercial banks and institutional and 
retail investors none 
Yes; infrastructure 
bonds only available 
to Ethiopian 
nationals and 
diaspora 
no active 
secondary 
market 
7.2 (2010) 
Ghana 23.7 (2010) 1Y-7Y 1Y-7Y fixed No / de facto 
weekly Yes 
mainly commercial banks (35% in 2013); 
also national pension fund, retail 
investors, insurance companies, firms 
considerable 
(>30% in 
2013) 
Yes, only allowed in 
bonds with tenors 
≥3Y 
50bps (2013) <0.1 (2010) 
Kenya 24.7 (2012) 1Y-30Y 2Y-20Y fixed Yes / 
monthly No 
mainly local commercial banks (50% in 
2013); also institutional investors (incl. 
mutual/pension funds and insurance 
companies) (30%) 
limited (<1% 
in 2013) No 50bps (2013) 0.7 (2010) 
Lesotho 5.0 (2010) 3Y-10Y N/A fixed Yes / two-
monthly No 
mainly commercial banks (90% in 2012); 
also institutional investors negligible No 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
no corporate bond 
market 
Madagascar 6.6 (2012) only bills none fixed No / none No mainly commercial banks (80% in 2012) negligible No 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
no corporate bond 
market 
Malawi 19.1 (2012) 2Y-5Y N/A fixed No / ad hoc No mainly central bank (75% in 2012); also 
commercial banks (15%), pension funds negligible 
Yes, only up to 10% 
of any class of 
security 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
N/A 
Mauritius 40.5 (2012) 3Y-15Y 3Y-5Y fixed; floating; indexed 
Yes / 
monthly Yes 
diversified: institutional investors (incl. 
pension funds and insurance companies) 
(55% in 2013); commercial banks (40%); 
also central bank, retail investors 
limited (<1% 
in 2013) No 
50-100bps 
(2013) 0.16 (2006) 
8

Table 1. (Continued)
 
 
Notes: Data are from OECD (2013), Mu et al. (2013), AFMI website (africanbondmarkets.org; last consulted: 16 October 2014), Standard Chartered Bank’s Local Market Compendium 2014, Ecobank’s Middle Africa Market Update 
(various issues) and country-specific documents. ‘Indexed’ = bond coupon indexed to domestic inflation rate. ‘Floating’ = bond coupon linked to domestic or international reference interest rate. ‘N/A’ = not available. 
Mozambique 4.5 (2012) 3Y-10Y 3Y-5Y fixed; floating 
Yes /  at 
unequal 
intervals 
Yes 
mainly commercial banks (65% in 2013); 
also central bank, insurance companies, 
investment management companies 
negligible 
Yes, exchange 
controls and foreign 
investment only 
allowed in specific 
bond issues 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
few corporate bonds 
Namibia 11.1 (2010) 2Y-22Y N/A fixed Yes / two-
weekly No 
mainly pension funds and insurance 
companies N/A No 
illiquid 
secondary 
market 
6.2 (2010) 
Nigeria 15.2 (2012) 2Y-20Y 3Y-20Y fixed; floating Yes / 
monthly Yes 
mainly local commercial banks (55% in 
2012) and institutional investors (incl. 
pension funds and insurance companies) 
(20%), also central bank 
considerable 
(20% in 
2012) 
No 
8-12bps for 
≤3Y); 3-6bps 
for >3Y (2013) 
3.8 (2010) 
Rwanda 8.8 (2010) 2Y-5Y N/A fixed Yes / quarterly No 
mainly commercial banks, pension funds 
and insurance companies; also retail 
investors 
limited No 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
<0.1 (2010) 
Sierra Leone 7.5 (2012) 1Y (and 5Y 
non-traded) 1Y fixed 
Yes / 
monthly Yes 
mainly commercial banks (75% in 2013); 
also central bank, institutional and retail 
investors 
N/A No 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
no corporate bond 
market 
South Africa 34.9 (2012) 1Y-35Y (> for indexed) 
2Y-10Y for 
fixed; 7Y-
30Y for 
indexed 
fixed; indexed Yes / 
weekly Yes 
mainly institutional investors (incl. pension 
funds and insurance companies) (45% in 
2013); also commercial banks (15%), 
central bank, retail investors, mutual funds 
and other 
considerable 
(35-40% in 
2013) 
No 
2-4bps for 
fixed; 3-5bps 
for indexed 
(2013) 
20.0 (2010) 
Swaziland 6.4 (2010) 2Y-10Y N/A fixed; floating 
Yes / at 
unequal 
intervals 
Yes 
mainly commercial banks (70% in 2013); 
also non-bank financial institutions (20%), 
central bank and others 
limited No 
very illiquid 
secondary 
market 
0.7 (2010) 
Tanzania 10.4 (2012) 2Y-15Y 2Y-10Y fixed Yes / two-
weekly Yes 
mainly commercial banks (55% in 2013); 
also institutional investors (incl. pension 
funds and insurance companies) (40%), 
central bank 
N/A 
Yes, only nationals 
and EAC foreigners 
can invest in bonds 
50bps (2013) 0.3 (2010) 
Uganda 13.0 (2012) 2Y-15Y 2Y-3Y fixed Yes / 
monthly Yes 
mainly commercial banks (50% in 2013); 
also institutional investors (incl. national 
social security fund and insurance 
companies), central bank  
considerable 
(10-20% in 
2013) 
No 50bps (2013) 0.4 (2010) 
Zambia 13.6 (2012) 2Y-15Y 2Y-5Y fixed Yes / quarterly No 
mainly commercial banks (35-50% in 
2013); also institutional investors (incl. 
pension funds and insurance companies) 
(>30%), central bank (15%)  
limited (5% 
in 2012) No 100bps (2013) 0.6 (2010) 
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Local banks continue to be the dominant investor class in African government LCBMs. 
According to Table 1 domestic commercial banks often hold 50% or more of outstanding 
government securities, especially in countries with the least developed LCBMs (Lesotho, 
Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Burundi). In some cases this situation reflects regulatory or 
supervisory requirements for banks to hold government debt in portfolio, but it may also 
mirror other forms of financial repression (Blommestein and Horman 2007). The dominance 
of local commercial banks matters for several reasons. First, a sound banking system is 
thought to be a key precondition for LCBM development (Ozkan et al. 2010; IMF et al. 
2013). Second, in the event of a domestic banking crisis, local banks’ bond holdings become 
overnight government debt (Panizza 2010). Third, with banks as the dominant investor class 
government LCBMs will no longer act as a ‘spare tyre’ when countries are facing a banking 
stress-induced credit crunch (Eichengreen 2008). Fourth, excessive holdings of local currency 
government debt by local banks increase the likelihood of crowding out private sector credit. 
This last point is of particular relevance in the African context, where private companies rely 
primarily on bank lending, partly due to the underdevelopment of corporate LCBMs 
(Christensen 2005). Therefore, an encouraging evolution in a number of African LCBMs is 
the growing role of local non-bank, institutional investors. For example, South African 
pension funds are now the largest group of resident investors in government bonds. Local 
pension funds and/or insurance companies are also major bond holders in Botswana, 
Mauritius, Namibia and Tanzania, while they account for non-negligible shares in Kenya, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia and others. As these institutional investors seek to match long-term 
assets with long-term liabilities (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak 2009), their expansion has 
gone hand-in-hand with the lengthening of government bond maturities. 
Another dimension covered (although very unevenly) by Table 1 is the presence of 
foreign investors in government LCBMs and the existence of restrictions thereon. We observe 
a diverse pattern. For example, in Ethiopia foreigners are banned completely from investing in 
infrastructure bonds. Both Angola and Mozambique operate strict exchange controls, whereas 
Botswana and Malawi apply quotas to foreign investment in certain government bond issues. 
Tanzania has only very recently opened up its LCBMs to residents of the East African 
Community (EAC). De facto, only South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda have markets 
with a considerable foreign presence. Foreign bond investment in emerging government 
LCBMs has both pros and cons. On the one hand, foreign investor participation expands the 
investor base, increasing liquidity and demand for longer-maturity bonds (IMF et al. 2013). 
Also, it may put extra pressure on improving financial intermediation and market 
infrastructure, thereby strengthening market functioning (World Bank and IMF 2001; Peiris 
2010). On the other hand, greater reliance on foreign investors increases the vulnerability of 
host countries to international shocks, especially of countries with weaker fundamentals 
(Ebeke and Lu 2014).  
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3. Drivers of government LCBMs in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
3.1. Related literature 
 
The question of what drives domestic public debt, and government LCBM development more 
particularly, in emerging markets and other developing countries has been the subject of a 
relatively new, but growing literature. Some authors study the determinants of the domestic 
share of total public debt or domestic public debt’s composition (Guscina 2008; Mehl and 
Reynaud 2010; Forslund et al. 2011), whereas others focus more narrowly on original sin 
(Hausmann and Panizza 2003; Mehl and Reynaud 2005) or emerging market LCBMs (Burger 
and Warnock 2006; Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2006; Claessens et al. 2007; 
Eichengreen et al. 2008; Bae 2012; Bhattacharyay 2013). The current paper is most related to 
two recent papers that look at Sub-Saharan Africa in particular.6 Both Adelegan and 
Radzewicz-Bak (2009) and Mu et al. (2013) use IMF and World Bank data to analyse the 
drivers of African government bond market capitalisation. They find that the capitalisation of 
such markets is affected by variables such as overall economic development, country area 
size, the fiscal balance, interest rate spreads, exchange rate and interest rate volatility, banking 
sector size, trade and capital account openness, common law legal origins and institutional 
quality. Some of these variables also seem to correlate with corporate bond markets.  
 
3.2. Empirical strategy and data description 
 
3.2.1. Model specification 
 
We estimate a series of panel data models which, in their most general form, can be written as 
follows: 
 
Yi,t = α + βXi,t-1  + δµi + γpit + εi,t ;             (1) 
 
where Yi,t  is the dependent variable, i.e., government LCBM capitalisation for country i in 
year t; Xi,t-1 is a vector of one-year lagged7 time-varying and time-invariant explanatory 
variables derived from the literature and described in more detail below; µi are country-
specific effects; pit is a common global factor; and εi,t is a well-behaved error term. 
 In our search for drivers of government LCBMs, we will use and compare a variety of 
panel data estimation techniques and model specifications. For our baseline estimations we 
rely on (i) pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) estimation, assuming a common intercept 
across countries (δ = 0 in Equation (1)) and (ii) the fixed effects (FE) (‘within’) estimator, 
which allows for country-specific effects that are correlated with other regressors. In the 
robustness section we also discuss the results of (iii) feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) 
and (iv) the random effects (RE) estimator. Due to limited within-country variation in our 
sample (see below) and relatively small sample size, some of the traditional diagnostic tests 
we present may not provide definitive answers to questions of model choice. Moreover, given 
11

the dominance of between-country variation, it makes sense to consider other estimators in 
parallel with FE(which eliminates all time-invariant heterogeneity between countries). 
In separate regressions we will explicitly control for persistence in LCBM 
capitalisation, in view of the possibility that government LCBM development is a process of 
gradual adjustment. We do so by adding a lag of the dependent variable, Yi,t-1, to Equation (1) 
and estimating the autoregressive relation by means of the ‘system’ generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimator, which uses internal instrumental variables to overcome dynamic 
panel bias. 
 
3.2.2. Sample, data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
As the source for our dependent variable we use the fourth edition of the OECD’s African 
Central Government Debt Statistical Yearbook (OECD 2013), henceforth the ‘African 
Yearbook’, which has a number of advantages over the datasets used by related papers 
covering Sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, the African Yearbook sources all its data on debt 
stocks directly from African debt management offices (or similar national agencies) 
participating in the OECD Project on African Public Debt Management and Bond Markets 
(see Blommestein and Ibarlucea Flores 2011), whereas other papers tend to mix primary and 
secondary (usually IMF and World Bank) data (e.g., Mu et al. 2013; Bua et al. 2014). Data 
collection is accomplished through a standardised questionnaire,circulated since 2010,  that 
follows the methodology of the Statistical Yearbook on Central Government Debt for OECD 
countries, which contributes to the cross-country comparability of debt stock data. 
 Second, the African Yearbook explicitly covers only central government debt 
(excluding the debt of state and local governments, social security funds and other state 
guarantees, which tend to be more heterogeneous across countries) and classifies this debt 
according to currency and whether or not it concerns marketable instruments.8 This allows us 
to construct a measure of government LCBM capitalisation, i.e., year-end outstanding local 
currency marketable central government debt as a percentage of GDP (lc_mdebt_gdp), which 
proxies well the kind of debt stock that protects governments against currency mismatches 
and generates positive spill-overs (see above). Other datasets classify government 
(marketable) debt based on creditor residency (Bua et al. 2014) or the place of issuance (Mu 
et al. 2013) and do not seem to explicitly take into account currency denomination. 
The fourth edition of the African Yearbook covers 17 countries over the span of ten 
years, from 2003 to 2012: Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia (all Sub-Saharan Africa), and Morocco and Tunisia. Limiting ourselves to the 15 Sub-
Saharan African countries only, leaves us with government LCBM capitalisation figures for 
an almost balanced panel sample of 137 observations. Because of the limited coverage of 
countries, we cannot claim that our results will be fully representative of government LCBMs 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, we believe this small but diverse set of African low-
income, lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income countries makes for interesting 
comparisons. 
Figure A.1 in Appendix evaluates our dependent variable against figures from Mu et 
al. (2013), which in principle should be similar, except for the fact that the latter do not 
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exclude domestically issued foreign currency marketable debt. It shows that the data generally 
correspond well, although not always. Closer inspection reveals large (hard-to-explain) breaks 
in Mu et al.’s (2013) government debt series for some countries, including Uganda and Sierra 
Leone, unlike in the African Yearbook data. Our analysis of an alternative dataset therefore  
constitutes a useful check of Mu et al.’s (2013) findings. 
Figure A.2 in Appendix plots the evolution of government LCBM capitalisation in our 
sample. There seems to be no clear common trend over the 2003-2012 period. In Mauritius, 
for example, market capitalisation steadily declined from 2003 to 2008 and remained stable 
thereafter, whereas in South Africa it increased rapidly after reaching a trough in 2009. The 
expansion of South Africa’s government LCBM in recent years is also apparent from Figure 
A.3 in Appendix, which plots the size of the four largest government LCBMs in absolute 
(nominal) US$ terms. Other notable expansions are those of Nigeria, over the whole of the 
2003-2012 period, and of Angola in 2008.9 Figure A.4 in Appendix shows government 
LCBMs’ share of total central government debt. Again we observe large country variations 
and very different trajectories. In South Africa and Mauritius LCBMs constituted more than 
80% of total government debt over the full sample period; whereas in Nigeria the share of 
LCBMs increased from just over 20% in 2003-2004 to 80% and beyond in 2006-2012, due to 
a huge debt relief package agreed on with Nigeria’s Paris Club creditors in October 2005. 
Similarly, the large increase in the range of LCBM shares of total government debt for other 
sample countries from 2006 onwards seems to have gone together with HIPC and MDRI debt 
relief. We will examine in greater detail the effect of debt relief on government LCBM 
capitalisation in the robustness section. 
The independent variables in our analysis were assembled from different databases 
and selected in line with the literature and maximum data availability for our specific sample. 
Table A.1 in Appendix lists all baseline variables, their labels, definitions and sources and 
gives the descriptive statistics. Below we discuss the rationale for incorporating them in our 
models as potential determinants of government LCBM capitalisation. 
 
Country size 
 
Larger-sized economies have scale advantages in developing deep and liquid LCBMs as the 
greater availability of potential buyers and sellers reduces price volatility and encourages 
investment, or because of important fixed market infrastructure costs (Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai 2006; Claessens et al. 2007). Also, LCBMs of larger economies are said 
to more easily attract foreign investors due to the greater diversification benefits they offer 
(Hausmann and Panizza 2003). On the other hand, smaller countries may need to rely more 
heavily on domestic public funding, lacking the creditworthiness to borrow sizeable amounts 
from abroad (Mu et al. 2013). We use log GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) as our 
preferred measure of economic size (ln_gdp_ppp). We complement it with a geographic 
measure of size, log surface area in squared kilometres (ln_area). 
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Economic development 
 
Financial development, in its various aspects, is often thought to co-evolve with broader 
economic development (see e.g., Calderon and Liu 2003; Levine 2005). Financial 
intermediation makes capital formation and investment possible by bringing together savers 
and borrowers. But as an economy grows, the demand for financial services and instruments 
is also expected to increase. We take log GDP per capita (PPP) as a broad proxy for the 
developmental stage of the economy (ln_gdppc_ppp). To the extent that GDP per capita is 
correlated with better governance and policies, stronger creditor rights and a more favourable 
investment climate, it may also capture some aspects of institutional quality not fully covered 
by the more explicit measures we consider (see below). 
 
Trade openness 
 
The expected relationship of government LCBM development with trade openness is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that in countries that are more 
open to trade, incumbent interest groups are less able to insist on policies that protect their 
advantage in relationship-based financing and suppress competing sources of finance, such as 
securities markets. On the other hand, however, for given financing needs, less integrated 
countries may be more incentivised to develop domestic bond markets (Mu et al. 2013). We 
measure trade openness as the ratio of total exports of goods and services to GDP (x_gdp). 
 
Banking sector size 
 
Bank- and (bond) market-based finance can be either substitutes or complements (see e.g., 
Levine 2002; Song and Thakor 2010). To the extent that banks already cater directly to the 
government there may be no immediate need to set up deep government LCBMs. But, at the 
same time, local banks often serve as primary dealers and market makers (Eichengreen et al. 
2008). In most African countries banks are also important government bond investors 
themselves (see above). We follow previous studies and the broader literature on bank 
financing in taking as a proxy for banking sector size domestic credit provided to the private 
sector (as a percentage of GDP) (domcred_gdp). 
 
Fiscal balance  
 
Another potentially important driver is the fiscal balance, i.e., government revenue minus 
government expenditure. Ceteris paribus, countries running negative fiscal balances (deficits) 
have greater need for issuing government bonds than those with positive fiscal balances 
(surpluses). That said, the fiscal balance may well be endogenous to government LCBM 
development. Especially in Africa, many governments face constraints in their ability to 
borrow so that the size of fiscal deficits may be in part driven by the availability of bond 
financing (Mu et al. 2013). Besides, large and sustained negative fiscal balances could 
perhaps undermine the trust of potential LCBM investors. To smoothen out transient factors 
we use a three-year moving average of the general government fiscal balance, defined as the 
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difference between revenue and total expenditure including the net acquisition of non-
financial assets by the government (and expressed as a percentage of GDP) (av_fiscbal_gdp). 
 
Inflation 
 
A lack of monetary policy credibility, as evident from high and/or volatile inflation rates, has 
been empirically established as a key impediment to developing government LCBMs (see 
e.g., Burger and Warnock 2006; Claessens et al. 2007). If creditors, domestic or foreign, fear 
that their claims may be inflated away by the government, this will prevent the latter from 
issuing longer-term local currency bonds (that are not indexed to domestic prices or foreign 
currency), unless they resort to financial repression of course (Forslund et al. 2011). 
Alternatively, in countries with high inflation, governments may not need to issue large debts 
as they derive revenues from the ‘inflation tax’. However, inflation may be endogenous too. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), for example, propose that better-developed LCBMs may 
create a political constituency opposed to inflationary policies and other forms of debt 
dilution. In support of this assertion, Rose (2014) finds that the existence of a longer-term 
government LCBM significantly lowers inflation, although only so in inflation-targeting 
countries. We consider here the inflation rate based on the consumer price index (infl_cp). 
 
Capital account openness 
 
The effect of capital account openness on LCBM development is again theoretically 
ambivalent. Just as trade openness, an open capital account can expose countries to market 
discipline, which would make domestic investors more interested in bonds (Claessens et al., 
2007); it is also a necessary trait to attract foreign investors. Conversely, governments may 
use capital controls to prevent domestic capital from leaving the country and create a captive 
investor base (Forslund et al. 2011). We employ a time-varying index of de jure capital 
account openness developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) (kaopen). Higher values of the index 
signify less capital controls and thus a more open capital account. 
 
Legal origins 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that in countries whose legal rules originate in the British 
common law tradition investors tend to be much better protected than in countries where the 
legal system is based on civil law, in particular French civil law. These legal origins may be 
especially important for LCBMs (Claessens et al. 2007). We use a dummy variable indicating 
whether the country in question has common law legal origins or not (comlaw). In our Sub-
Saharan African sample, nine out of 15 are common law countries (Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia); the other six all have a 
French civil law tradition. 
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Other government debt 
 
Some factors we have considered so far may be correlated with both LCBMs and other 
marketable and non-marketable government debt stocks; but there could also be substitution 
effects between different kinds of debt for given financing needs. Moreover, with the 
exception of South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia and Angola, all countries in our sample have 
enjoyed substantial debt relief or at least debt restructuring in recent years, mostly as part of 
the HIPC initiative and MDRI. Since HIPC granted debt relief on non-marketable debt owed 
to foreign multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors, while at the same time ‘forcing’ 
countries to use their domestic debt markets (Arnone and Presbitero 2010), we would again 
expect a negative relation between government LCBMs and the rest of the government debt 
stock. To ensure consistency with our dependent variable, we use as other government debt 
stock the complement of LCBM capitalisation, i.e., all central government debt apart from 
local currency marketable debt as a percentage of GDP, taken from the OECD’s African 
Yearbook (othdebt_gdp). This broad measure thus includes all foreign and local currency 
non-marketable government debt (i.e., multilateral, bilateral and commercial loans, but also 
central bank advances) as well as foreign currency marketable government debt (i.e., foreign 
currency securities, irrespective of whether they were issued domestically or in international 
markets). 
 
Institutional quality 
 
Many institutional arrangements beyond those captured by dichotomous time-invariant legal 
origins could possibly have an effect on the functioning and development of government 
LCBMs, including contract and property rights enforcement, the impartiality of the legal 
system, strength of the regulatory framework and corruption (Mu et al. 2013). Since we have 
no priors on the relative importance of different institutional dimensions we construct a 
composite index from four indicators of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
(comprisk_icrg): investment profile, law and order, bureaucracy, and corruption. Higher 
values of the composite index indicate better overall institutional quality.10  
 
Democracy 
 
It is often argued that the strength of democratic political systems has a distinct impact on the 
choice of government policies. By extension, there may also be an impact on the pace and 
scope of financial sector development, including progress in LCBM development. Haber et al. 
(2007) claim that the openness and competitiveness of a country’s political system tend to be 
reflected in the openness and competitiveness of its financial system. Moreover, constraints 
on the power of democratic governments are said to increase political stability and enhance 
the credibility of commitments towards investors/creditors (North and Weingast 1989). We 
follow Claessens et al. (2007) in using as an explanatory variable the institutionalised 
democracy index of the Polity IV database (democ) (see Marshall et al. 2013). This index 
scores countries on the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
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competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive; with higher 
scores meaning stronger democratic institutions.  
 From the descriptive statistics in Table A.1 in Appendix it is clear that the lion share 
of variation arises from differences between countries rather than from within-country 
changes over time, except for independent variables inflation and other government debt; an 
issue to which we will come back in the following sections. Panels (a)-(k) of Figure A.5 in 
Appendix plot our measure of government LCBM capitalisation against the proposed 
explanatory variables. These scatter plots suggest a positive relation of government LCBM 
capitalisation with economic development, trade openness, private sector domestic credit, 
capital account openness, common law legal origins, institutional quality and the strength of 
democracy; and a negative relation with country surface area, past fiscal balances, inflation 
and other government debt. Some of these relations however hinge on the inclusion of South 
Africa and/or Mauritius, which are outliers in a number of dimensions. 
 To control for common global conditions (pit in Equation (1)) we also include in our 
estimations the annual average of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility 
Index or VIX, a general measure of global investor sentiment calculated from stock index 
option prices (vix) (with higher values indicating higher global risk aversion).11 
 
3.3. Results and discussion 
 
3.3.1. Baseline estimation results 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results for different specifications of Equation (1), estimated 
by POLS and FE. Because of our limited sample, it is hard to find variables that are robustly 
correlated with the capitalisation of African government LCBMs. However, there seem to be 
a number of macroeconomic and institutional variables which do show significant effects 
and/or consistent signs throughout. 
POLS estimates, which capture jointly between- and within-country variation and 
ignore country-specific effects, show that having better past fiscal balances is negatively 
correlated with LCBM capitalisation, probably because of the lesser need for governments to 
issue bonds. This result is in line with previous studies, for Africa and other regions. As 
expected, past inflation is found to exert a negative (but economically small) effect on 
capitalisation. Countries with a common law tradition have government LCBMs that are 
significantly larger than countries with legal origins rooted in French civil law, a result that is 
again conform with the literature. POLS models further suggest that the banking sector (the 
size of which is proxied by private sector credit) and government LCBMs are complements 
(in three out of four specifications), and indicate positive partial correlations of trade 
openness, overall institutional quality and the strength of democracy with LCBM 
capitalisation. The negative coefficient of other central government debt is not economically 
meaningful. Smaller-sized countries have on average relatively larger government LCBMs, 
but this seems to be due to the inclusion in our sample of Mauritius (which is absent from the 
model in column (3)).We do not discern any clear effects of GDP, GDP per capita, capital 
account openness or the VIX. 
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The picture that emerges from the FE estimates in Table 2, concentrating on within-
country variation, is rather different. Worsening fiscal balances and declining inflation are 
still associated with increases in government LCBM capitalisation and also the positive 
correlation with institutional quality is preserved. Contrary to POLS, however, the FE 
estimator seems to point at substitution effects between banks and bonds. Furthermore, none 
of the other coefficients is significantly different from zero.12 Breusch-Pagan LM tests lead to 
a clear rejection of the null hypothesis of no country-specific effects, whereas Hausman-type 
overidentification tests strongly reject the null that such country effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors, for all four model specifications. This seems to imply that the FE 
estimator is preferred over POLS and RE. However, diagnostic tests such as the Hausman test 
may perform poorly in small samples and when within-country time variation of variables is 
limited, which very much applies to our panel (see above). Similarly, FE’s sole focus on 
within-country differences may not be appropriate to assess whether certain slowly-changing 
variables, such as institutional quality or the strength of democracy, drive government LCBM 
development. It thus seems imperative to also study and compare the results of other 
estimators, like simple POLS. 
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Table 2. Baseline results - POLS/FE estimations 
 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.ln_gdp_ppp 0.134 -0.016 0.147 0.988 13.731 13.648 -5.576 15.105 
 [0.955] [0.856] [0.962] [1.098] [20.449] [18.665] [12.097] [20.417] 
ln_area -3.609*** -3.532*** -1.090 -3.163***     
 [0.683] [0.626] [1.560] [0.755]     
L.ln_gdppc_ppp -1.507 -1.459 -1.863 1.111 -20.352 -19.533 9.523 -23.210 
 [2.279] [2.372] [1.847] [2.802] [31.130] [30.286] [17.436] [31.578] 
L.x_gdp 0.309*** 0.304*** 0.201** 0.214* -0.002 -0.040 -0.037 -0.006 
 [0.084] [0.083] [0.073] [0.110] [0.056] [0.092] [0.072] [0.052] 
L.domcred_gdp 0.169*** 0.163*** 0.128** 0.070 -0.098* -0.103* -0.091+ -0.089+ 
 [0.043] [0.048] [0.046] [0.068] [0.050] [0.055] [0.060] [0.051] 
L.av_fiscbal_gdp -0.520*** -0.618** -0.287* -0.516*** -0.187* -0.235** -0.156+ -0.205* 
 [0.149] [0.217] [0.143] [0.158] [0.097] [0.104] [0.095] [0.101] 
L.infl_cp -0.123** -0.109** -0.073** -0.111+ -0.101* -0.108* -0.054+ -0.107* 
 [0.055] [0.047] [0.029] [0.067] [0.055] [0.054] [0.032] [0.058] 
L.kaopen 0.646 0.564 -0.231 0.568 -1.188 -1.293 -0.589 -1.600 
 [0.698] [0.635] [0.831] [0.634] [1.470] [1.516] [1.220] [1.654] 
comlaw 7.250*** 6.971*** 9.335*** 6.350***     
 [1.841] [1.845] [1.928] [1.759]     
othdebt_gdp  -0.030+    -0.005   
  [0.018]    [0.016]   
L.comprisk_icrg   4.510+    2.859+  
   [2.923]    [2.048]  
L.democ    1.026**    0.594 
    [0.461]    [0.473] 
vix -0.071 -0.052 -0.046 -0.079 0.024 0.044 0.015 0.027 
 [0.077] [0.087] [0.077] [0.073] [0.054] [0.052] [0.059] [0.053] 
constant 54.728*** 54.590** 17.629 27.823 124.479 121.678 -39.941 138.090 
 [17.920] [18.528] [23.918] [22.665] [164.158] [165.076] [87.518] [166.109] 
Observations 137 124 127 137 137 124 127 137 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2/R2-within (for FE) 0.850 0.858 0.761 0.871 0.208 0.231 0.177 0.227 
Intra-class correlation ρ      0.992 0.992 0.973 0.993 
Hausman p-value     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is lc_mdebt_gdp, year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt (% of GDP). Sample 
countries, years and independent variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. All independent variables are one-year lagged, 
except for ln_area, comlaw, othdebt_gdp and vix. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 
0.05; *p < 0.10; +p<0.20. 
 
 
3.3.2. General robustness tests and additional government LCBM correlates 13 
 
There are many ways in which we can test our baseline findings for robustness. First, we re-
estimate the models of Table 2 with FGLS, an estimator that can better handle heteroskedastic 
error structures and panel-specific autocorrelation than POLS; and with RE, which is more 
efficient than FE but assumes country-specific effects are distributed randomly across 
countries and independently from other explanatory variables. Table A.2 in Appendix shows 
that FGLS and RE estimations confirm the negative correlation of fiscal balances and 
inflation with LCBM capitalisation and the positive coefficients of common law legal origins, 
institutional quality and democracy that we found using POLS and/or FE. Other effects we 
identified in POLS models, such as those of trade openness and banking sector size, seem not 
particularly robust. 
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Second, we exclude, in turn, South Africa and Mauritius from our sample, which can 
be considered outliers in terms of absolute/relative government LCBM sizes and in a number 
of other dimensions (see Figures A.2-A.5). Apart from Mauritius’ influence on the negative 
area size effect, none of our findings seems to be entirely driven by any of these two 
countries. If anything, the exclusion of Mauritius boosts the economic significance of the 
common law dummy (since Mauritius has French legal origins and still relatively large 
LCBMs). Excluding both countries reduces the significance of the fiscal balance coefficient, 
but leaves other results intact. 
Third, we have tried alternative measures for some of our key variables. Replacing 
consumer price-based inflation with a GDP deflator-based measure somewhat reduces the 
economic significance of the inflation coefficient but produces otherwise almost identical 
results. Capping consumer price inflation at 25%, which effectively eliminates three data 
points with extreme inflation from our sample (i.e., Angola in 2002, 2003 and 2004), the 
economic and statistical significance of the negative inflation effect on government LCBM 
capitalisation increases, rather than decreases. Also, replacing our preferred three-year 
moving average fiscal balance measure with a simple one-year lag yields very similar results. 
Fourth, we have further investigated the role of institutional quality, substituting our 
ICRG composite measure by a similarly constructed index based on the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dimensions of regulatory quality, the rule of law, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Government 
LCBM capitalisation is again positively correlated with better institutions. This positive 
correlation is highly significant in POLS models, but not when employing FE (probably due 
to the even more limited time variation in this institutional quality index). Inserting the 
different ICRG scores separately rather than as part of a composite index, shows it is not 
straightforward to pinpoint the positive effect of overall institutional quality to one particular 
dimension. The strongest results are for the investment profile and bureaucratic quality, the 
coefficients of which are statistically significant in POLS specifications.  
 Fifth, we have replaced our broad institutionalised democracy index with one of its 
components, executive constraints, which more narrowly measures the extent of 
institutionalised restraints on the decision-making powers of a country’s chief executives, be 
it individuals or collective bodies. In line with our baseline results, this variable is found to be 
positively and highly significantly correlated with LCBM capitalisation using POLS, but not 
in the case of FE. 
 Sixth, in Table A.3 in Appendix we augment our baseline model specification (column 
(1) of Table 2) with three additional explanatory variables suggested by Mu et al. (2013) and 
constructed from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Bank lending spreads 
(spread), defined as the (annually averaged) difference between the interest rate charged by 
banks on loans to prime private sector customers and the LIBOR, bear a significantly negative 
coefficient in the FE model. This may point to lower bank competition and/or efficiency 
hampering LCBM development (as banks are important participants in government LCBMs). 
The inclusion of the bank lending spread renders the inflation coefficient insignificant, which 
can be explained by high collinearity between spreads and inflation in our sample. Interest 
rate variability (intvol), which we calculate as the yearly standard deviation of monthly 
treasury bill rates (or money market rates, if treasury bill rates are unavailable; cf. Adelegan 
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and Radzewicz-Bak 2009), seems also negatively correlated with government LCBM 
capitalisation, although not significantly so in the FE model. Volatile interest rates increase 
uncertainty for both investors and issuers, or may just reflect illiquid money and bond markets 
(Mu et al. 2013). We have also added a common indicator of exchange rate variability, i.e., 
the yearly standard deviation of first differences in log nominal monthly exchange rates 
against the US dollar (which proxies unanticipated deviations from a constant trend) (xrtvol). 
The effect of exchange rate variability on LCBMs is a priori ambiguous (Mu et al. 2013). On 
the one hand, less volatile exchange rates may encourage investor demand for local currency 
bonds, especially from foreign investors. On the other hand, relatively stable exchange rates 
may lead governments (as well as foreigner investors) to underestimate the risk of foreign 
currency borrowing (lending) and thereby reduce incentives to develop domestic financial 
intermediation (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2006). Table A.3 indicates that the 
exchange rate variability coefficient is very imprecisely estimated in both POLS and FE 
models. The estimated effects of key variables like the fiscal balance and inflation remain 
however virtually unchanged.14 
 Seventh, we have looked more closely at the role of debt relief in government LCBM 
development. Arnone and Presbitero (2010) present some evidence suggestive of increased 
domestic public debt accumulation after countries’ graduation from their HIPC decision point, 
whereas Merotto et al. (2014) find that the recent (mostly moderate) return to borrowing by 
African governments having enjoyed debt relief has been driven predominantly by new 
external borrowing (in foreign currency). Figure A.6 in Appendix shows the evolution of the 
non-marketable debt stock that has been the subject of debt relief under the HIPC initiative 
(i.e., outstanding loans owed to multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors) as well as our 
measure of government LCBM capitalisation for the five countries that reached their HIPC 
completion point during the 2003-2012 sample period: Madagascar (2004), Zambia (2005), 
Cameroon (2006), Malawi (2006) and Sierra Leone (2006).15 To facilitate comparison, we 
have plotted the evolution of debt stocks in a five-year window centred around each of these 
HIPCs’ respective completion points. From panel (a) of Figure A.6 one can evidently see the 
direct effect of HIPC debt relief on non-marketable debt stocks in the completion point and/or 
subsequent years. However, in panel (b) we do not discern a very clear impact on LCBMs. 
Only in Malawi and Zambia there seems to have been an increase in government LCBM 
capitalisation following completion point. Tables 2 and A.2 already showed the lack of a 
strong link between LCBMs and other government debt stocks. In Table A.4 in Appendix we 
introduce a set of HIPC completion point dummies (hipc_cp). The POLS and FE results 
suggest that there is no immediate response of LCBM capitalisation to HIPC debt relief, 
although we do find a (small) positive coefficient for the two-year lagged HIPC completion 
point dummy. This could possibly indicate a delayed effect of HIPC debt relief on LCBMs, or 
reflect the fact that often (part of) actual debt stock relief takes place some time after the 
official completion point. Similar results are obtained if we incorporate into these dummy 
variables Nigeria’s 2005 Paris Club deal (which entailed substantial relief outside HIPC). The 
positive debt relief effect disappears completely when including instead dummies for all post-
HIPC completion point years or for the year 2006 (when all HIPCs in our sample received 
MDRI relief). We acknowledge that more research is needed to fully disentangle the links 
between debt relief and government LCBMs.16 
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Lastly, we further test the substitutability between government LCBMs and alternative 
sources of finance. From the OECD-DAC’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
database we have constructed the three-year moving average of past net aid inflows as a 
percentage of GDP (i.e., aid grants plus net concessional loans, excluding debt relief) 
(av_oda_gdp). Table A.4 shows that the aid variable’s coefficient takes a negative sign and is 
highly significant in POLS but not in FE estimations (since aid inflows differ mostly between 
countries). The negative fiscal balance effect on government LCBM capitalisation seems only 
marginally affected by the inclusion of the aid variable. To more explicitly take into account 
different forms of market access, we have also replaced our broad other government debt 
stock variable, in turn, by two of its subcomponents (again sourced from the African 
Yearbook and scaled to GDP): foreign currency marketable debt (which includes the 
international bonds some countries have issued) (fc_mdebt_gdp) and foreign currency non-
marketable loans from commercial creditors (typically syndicated international bank loans) 
(fc_com_nmdebt_gdp). Using the second subcomponent however further reduces our sample. 
Table A.4 indicates a significant substitution effect between government LCBM capitalisation 
and both debt stock subcomponents in POLS estimations; it also suggests a positive 
correlation between LCBMs and the stock of commercial creditor loans when employing FE. 
This apparent complementarity between LCBMs and commercial creditor loans may seem 
counterintuitive but perhaps reflects that (local currency) marketable and (foreign currency) 
non-marketable debt constitute substantially different asset classes for investors and/or are 
used for different purposes by debtor governments. Interestingly, the fiscal balance coefficient 
again hardly changes and remains significant.17  
   
3.3.3. Dynamic panel estimations 
 
So far we have not allowed for the likely possibility that government LCBM capitalisation is a 
cumulative process. LCBM development in one period is expected to be an important 
determinant of the state of the LCBM in the next period; most obviously because LCBM 
capitalisation is a stock variable (with longer-maturity bond issues staying on governments’ 
books for several years), but perhaps also due to the typically gradual nature of adaptations to 
the existing market infrastructure, or the persistence of a good/bad reputation in repaying 
bonds. The most straightforward way to introduce these dynamics into our model is by adding 
a one-year lag of the dependent variable, Yi,t-1, to Equation (1). For such an autoregressive 
model, however, POLS, FGLS, RE and standard FE estimators are known to be biased and 
inconsistent (especially in short-term panels as ours), because of the correlation of the lagged 
dependent variable with the error term (Nickell 1981).  
 The difference and system GMM estimators developed and popularised by Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) tackle the dynamic panel bias; in addition, they can be used to control for the 
endogeneity of other regressors too.18 The idea behind difference GMM is to apply a first-
difference transformation to the dynamic model and then to instrument the first-differenced 
lagged dependent variable, and other potentially non-exogenous regressors, with suitable lags 
of the untransformed (level) explanatory variables. One problem with the difference GMM 
estimator is that it may produce large finite sample bias and very imprecise estimates, in 
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particular when the process under study is highly persistent (in which case lagged levels of 
variables are only weak instruments for first differences); when time series are short; and/or 
when the variance of fixed effects is large relative to the variance of idiosyncratic errors.19 In 
these instances, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest using the more efficient system GMM 
estimator, which complements the first-differenced equation instrumented by lagged levels 
with the original level equation instrumented by lagged differences. The validity of the 
additional moment conditions of system GMM rests on the assumption that deviations of the 
dependent variable from its long-run conditional mean are not systematically related to the 
fixed effects. This implies that the subjects studied (here: countries) should not be too far 
from their steady states at the beginning of the sample period (Roodman 2009).  
 
Table 3. Dynamic panel results - system GMM estimations 
 
 System GMM 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
L.lc_mdebt_gdp 0.787*** 0.728*** 0.916*** 0.700*** 0.783*** 0.727*** 0.901*** 0.726*** 
 [0.140] [0.149] [0.236] [0.115] [0.131] [0.114] [0.238] [0.084] 
ln_gdp_ppp 0.307 0.294 0.197 0.248 0.523+ 0.241 0.222 0.562 
 [0.385] [0.320] [0.373] [0.288] [0.314] [1.268] [0.368] [0.458] 
ln_area -0.468 -0.744 -0.173 -0.868* -0.407 -0.145 -0.216 -0.683* 
 [0.490] [0.623] [0.841] [0.427] [0.443] [2.097] [0.779] [0.324] 
ln_gdppc_ppp -0.225 0.325 -1.554** -0.191 0.102 2.671 -1.449+ 0.155 
 [0.767] [1.509] [0.722] [1.039] [0.877] [6.954] [1.055] [1.181] 
x_gdp 0.101* 0.088 0.086* 0.131*** 0.086+ 0.013 0.085* 0.106** 
 [0.049] [0.132] [0.045] [0.041] [0.051] [0.194] [0.044] [0.043] 
domcred_gdp 0.014 0.019 0.022 0.026 -0.004 -0.028 0.021 0.001 
 [0.025] [0.029] [0.035] [0.022] [0.023] [0.100] [0.025] [0.031] 
av_fiscbal_gdp -0.421*** -0.417 -0.034  -0.409** -0.318 -0.040  
 [0.139] [0.636] [0.128]  [0.144] [0.329] [0.127]  
infl_cp -0.213*** -0.089 -0.149* -0.144*** -0.214*** -0.066+ -0.153* -0.147*** 
 [0.044] [0.077] [0.073] [0.046] [0.045] [0.039] [0.077] [0.045] 
kaopen 0.054 0.056 0.071 0.038 0.045 0.178 0.072 0.011 
 [0.181] [0.255] [0.193] [0.151] [0.150] [0.431] [0.162] [0.133] 
comlaw 1.846 2.075 0.990 2.623** 1.692+ 1.848*** 1.074 2.158** 
 [1.397] [2.301] [1.733] [1.097] [1.217] [0.568] [1.562] [0.856] 
vix -0.003 -0.018 0.035 -0.099 -0.005 -0.028 0.031 -0.092 
 [0.042] [0.102] [0.064] [0.085] [0.042] [0.054] [0.066] [0.078] 
democ     0.228 0.396 0.037 0.292+ 
     [0.178] [0.719] [0.276] [0.175] 
fiscbal_gdp    -0.425*    -0.379* 
    [0.223]    [0.198] 
constant 6.310 5.886 10.782 12.263* 2.362 -17.141 10.616+ 6.103 
 [7.657] [13.289] [9.852] [6.110] [7.435] [67.422] [6.458] [7.826] 
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
# instruments 14 15 14 14 15 16 15 15 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.000 0.000 
AR(1)  p-value 0.018 0.061 0.017 0.020 0.014 0.008 0.020 0.008 
AR(2)  p-value 0.536 0.496 0.560 0.561 0.531 0.436 0.559 0.480 
Hansen p-value 0.635 0.593 0.477 0.756 0.705 0.630 0.472 0.881 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is lc_mdebt_gdp, year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt (% of GDP). Sample 
countries, years and independent variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported 
in brackets. Number of observations refers to number of data points in the untransformed (level) equation. Number of instrument lags is 
limited to one and instrument matrix is collapsed. Columns (a): only av_fiscbal_gdp predetermined; columns (b): av_fiscbal_gdp and infl_cp 
predetermined; columns (c): av_fiscbal_gdp endogenous; columns (d): fiscbal_gdp endogenous. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; 
+p<0.20. 
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Table 3 presents the results of two-step system GMM estimations of the autoregressive 
LCBM capitalisation model, with small sample statistics and the Windmeijer (2005) 
correction for standard errors. Importantly, Roodman (2009) points out that GMM estimations 
with too many instruments tend to ‘overfit’ the endogenous variables and weaken the power 
of Hansen tests for instrument validity.o keep the total instrument count below (or at least 
close to) the number of cross-sectional units we limit the number of instrument lags to just 
one; ‘collapse’ the instrument matrix; and estimate only the model specifications for which 
we have data on all 15 sample countries (i.e., the specifications in columns (1) and (4) of 
Table 2).20 Whereas our primary motivation for employing GMM estimation techniques here 
is to be able to include lagged government LCBM capitalisation as an extra explanatory 
variable, we have also attempted to account for the potential endogeneity of some of our 
baseline regressors using GMM’s internal instruments. Good external instruments would 
arguably be better-suited to establish causality but are very difficult to find in practice. 
Following Mu et al. (2013) and our prior economic intuitions (spelled out in the discussion of 
baseline variables) we choose to instrument, above all, the fiscal balance and, in second 
instance, also inflation. Table 3 makes different endogeneity assumptions: in columns (a) the 
fiscal balance variable is modelled as a predetermined variable, whereas the other independent 
variables are considered strictly exogenous; in columns (b) both the fiscal balance and 
inflation are assumed predetermined; in columns (c) the fiscal balance is modelled to be 
endogenous; and in columns (d) we replace the original three-year moving average fiscal 
balance by an endogenised single-year measure.21 
Table 3 clearly shows the high degree of persistence in government LCBMs, with the 
autoregressive parameter on the lagged dependent variable (L.lc_mdebt_gdp) estimated as 
being between 0.7 and 0.9. Similar as in the static FE models, it is difficult to robustly identify 
effects for most explanatory variables. The coefficients for time-invariant legal origins and 
our slowly changing democracy variable always take the expected positive sign, but are 
estimated with relatively large standard errors. However, in line with our previous results, we 
find a significantly negative impact of inflation on LCBM development in seven out of eight 
system GMM estimations. The fiscal balance coefficient is also consistently negative, but 
becomes very small and statistically insignificant once modelled as endogenous. Interestingly, 
when the three-year moving average fiscal balance is substituted by an endogenised single-
year measure, with inherently more within-country variation, we again find a significantly 
negative impact on LCBMs. This illustrates that one needs to be realistic about the extent to 
which GMM estimators can be used to firmly establish causality in our sample, because of 
relatively small sample size (GMM being a large-N estimator) and limited time variation in 
most variables. 
 Looking at the diagnostic tests at the bottom of Table 3, Arellano-Bond AR(2) tests 
reassure us that there is no second-order autocorrelation in differenced residuals and therefore 
no first-order correlation in the level residuals. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
furthermore suggests that the null of joint validity of our instruments is never rejected. For 
robustness, in Table A.5 in Appendix we re-estimate the specifications of Table 3 using the 
difference GMM estimator, which is less efficient than system GMM but also makes fewer 
assumptions (see above).22 The results are overall very similar; controlling for persistence in 
LCBM capitalisation, the fiscal balance and inflation stand out as the most robust correlates. 
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Moreover, applying system GMM to the alternative specifications we have considered before, 
i.e., models including (one by one) bank lending spreads, interest or exchange rate variability, 
HIPC completion point dummies, aid inflows, foreign currency marketable debt, or 
commercial creditor loans, we fail to find any statistically significant correlation with 
government LCBMs beyond the negative effects of the fiscal balance, inflation and, perhaps, 
aid inflows (significant at the 10% level).      
 
  
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper has studied the current state and drivers of government LCBMs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a region whose progress in developing such markets has not received much systematic 
attention in the literature thus far. We have argued that well-developed government LCBMs 
could reduce countries’ exposure to external shocks; help overcome ‘original sin’; facilitate 
domestic savings mobilisation; and may have important financial, macroeconomic and 
institutional spill-over effects. With detailed information collected from various sources, the 
paper has first shown that quite a few African countries have made significant progress in 
developing government LCBMs. Increasingly, African governments issue fixed-rate local 
currency bonds with tenors of ten years and more on a regular basis. Moreover, the non-bank, 
local institutional investor base has continued to grow. But we have also demonstrated that 
LCBMs in Africa often have low liquidity, feature very few corporate securities and generally 
still have relatively narrow investor bases dominated by commercial banks. 
In the second part of our study we have presented an econometric analysis of the 
drivers of African government LCBMs based on a new high-quality panel dataset of central 
government debt in 15 African countries, which was sourced directly from these countries’ 
debt management offices and compiled by the OECD. Our estimations indicate that, on 
average, government LCBM capitalisation is larger in African countries with lower fiscal 
balances, lower inflation, common law legal origins, higher institutional quality and stronger 
democratic political systems. Controlling for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity and 
persistence in LCBM development, we find above all that a worsening fiscal balance and 
declining inflation are associated with increases in government LCBM capitalisation. These 
key results are robust to the use of different estimators, the exclusion of outliers, alternative 
measures for our key variables and the inclusion of additional potential correlates of 
government LCBMs. There are some indications that LCBM capitalisation may also be linked 
to lower bank lending spreads, lower interest rate variability, past debt relief and alternative 
financing sources, including aid, although such links were seemingly not robust across 
estimators and require further research. 
Our main findings generally correspond well with those of the broader domestic public 
debt and bond market literature and of Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) and Mu et al. 
(2013) on Africa, in particular on the importance of the fiscal balance, legal origins and 
institutions. Some of the differences in results between the current paper and Mu et al. (2013), 
for example the lack of significance of exchange rate variability and trade or capital account 
openness as drivers of government LCBMs in our estimations, may be due to subtle 
differences in the way LCBM capitalisation is defined and our use of primary rather than 
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secondary IMF and World Bank data; differences in the set of regressors we include; and our 
explicit accounting for LCBM persistence in GMM specifications; as well as to differences in 
sample countries and the time period considered. We acknowledge that relatively small 
sample size and limited within-country variation are drawbacks to our econometric analysis. 
Larger country samples and longer time series will be needed to increase the 
representativeness of our results for Sub-Saharan Africa and to achieve better identification of 
any causal relations. 
Moreover, the econometric work in this paper has narrowly focused on government 
LCBM capitalisation, ignoring other dimensions of LCBM development. From our more 
detailed, multi-source cross-sectional overview it is apparent that African government 
LCBMs differ in many other aspects too, including liquidity and the length of tenors of bonds 
typically issued. Panel data analysis of variables such as secondary market turnover, bid-ask 
spreads, average maturity and yields of local currency government bonds would surely 
complement the current paper and enrich our understanding of Sub-Sahara African LCBMs. 
To our knowledge, however, such data are currently not (publicly) available (in a comparable 
format) for a wider range of countries in the region. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1
 See publicdebtnet.org/export/sites/PDM/public/MoreAboutUs/G8/G20_LCBM_3_4_Nov_2011_Cannes.pdf. 
2
 We do not know, however, of any issuance of local currency securities in international markets by African 
governments, so that all local currency marketable central government debt can be assumed to have been issued 
domestically. 
3
 All countries in Table 1 are non-CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine); for overviews of the regionally 
organised LCBMs of CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) and WAEMU (West 
African Economic and Monetary Union) countries we refer to Beaugrand et al. (2002), Sy (2010) and Diouf and 
Boutin-Dufresne (2012). 
4
 See, e.g., Mboweni (2006), Asogwa and Ezema (2005) and Mbewa et al. (2007) on the early history of the 
relatively large and developed LCBMs in South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, respectively.  
5
 Similar observations are made by Didier and Schmukler (2014) in their study of the LCBMs of emerging 
economies in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
6
 Andrianaivo and Yartey (2010) also study the determinants of African financial market development but focus 
on banking systems and stock markets rather than bond markets. 
7
 The reasons for using lagged variables here are twofold. First, our dependent variable extends to the year 2012, 
whereas some explanatory variables were only available up to 2011 at the time of writing. Second, the use of 
lagged regressors also diminishes endogeneity concerns. 
8
 ‘Local currency’ debt is defined in the African Yearbook as debt denominated in, or indexed to, local currency. 
This may include debt for which settlements occur in foreign currency, provided that the cash flows are not 
indexed to foreign currency (i.e., economic exposure needs to be to the local currency). ‘Marketable’ debt refers 
to instruments (securities) that can be bought and sold in the secondary market. The African Yearbook further 
subdivides non-marketable debt into loans from multilateral, bilateral and commercial creditors and a residual 
category (which may include central bank advances) (see OECD 2013). 
9
 In April 2014 Nigeria revised its GDP base year, resulting in a 89% increase in its 2013 GDP estimate. In this 
paper we use the old nominal GDP series to scale our LCBM measure, which is arguably how market 
participants perceived the Nigerian economy prior to the rebasing. 
10
 Note that Mauritius is not rated on these ICRG dimensions by the PRS Group. 
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11
 We choose not to include time fixed effects (year dummies) to account for global trends as this leads to 
‘overfitted’ models with few degrees of freedom, due to our small sample size. Very similar results are obtained 
if we replace the VIX with other (yearly averaged) global variables, such as the Bank of America-Merrill Lynch 
US high yield spread (of below-investment grade US corporate bonds over US Treasuries) or the US Effective 
Federal Funds rate, or when including a linear time trend instead. 
12
 Since country area size and legal origins are time-invariant variables they are dropped in the FE estimations. 
13
 To save space, not all the estimations mentioned in this section are reported. All results are, however, available 
from the authors upon request. 
14
 We deviate from Mu et al. (2013) in calculating annual interest rate and exchange rate variability, rather than 
over ten-year periods, We do so because of our limited sample period and in order to bring in more within-
country variation. 
15
 All HIPCs in our sample passed their decision points before 2003. Uganda reached its (enhanced) HIPC 
completion point in 2000, and Mozambique and Tanzania both in 2001. 
16
 Ideally, one would attempt to account for the concessionality of the debt stock involved in debt relief 
operations and for whether the relief consists of outright debt forgiveness or concessional rescheduling by using 
Net Present Value (NPV) estimates of debt relief. Such NPV measures have been constructed by Depetris 
Chauvin and Kraay (2005) and used, for example, in Presbitero (2009) and Johansson (2010). To our knowledge, 
however, the annual NPV debt relief measures of Depetris Chauvin and Kraay (2005) have not been updated 
beyond 2003, which prevents us from including them in our econometric analysis. 
17
 We find qualitatively similar results when replacing the commercial creditor loan variable from the African 
Yearbook with a measure of international claims by BIS-reporting banks on the public sector of our sample 
countries, obtained from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. 
18
 Whereas GMM estimators were originally developed for microeconomic panel data research with many cross-
sectional units (large N) and short time series (small T), they are now also commonly used in macroeconomic 
research. Of the above-mentioned studies related to the current paper, both Mu et al. (2013) and Mehl and 
Reynaud (2005) report system GMM estimations. Only Mehl and Reynaud (2005), who analyse domestic 
original sin, include a lagged dependent variable in one of their models. Mu et al. (2013) use GMM techniques 
primarily to attempt to control for the potential endogeneity of some of the regressors in their models but do not 
seem to account explicitly for persistence in LCBM capitalisation with an autoregressive factor. 
19
 In the extreme case of the process being a random walk, where the autoregressive parameter equals one and 
the series has a unit root, there will be no correlation at all between the first-differenced series (‘white noise’) 
and lagged levels of the series. This implies that the difference GMM estimator does not identify the 
autoregressive parameter and will not provide any information on this parameter (Bond et al. 2005). 
20
 Models with a higher instrument count, relative to cross-sectional units, lead to very inefficient estimates and 
unreliable diagnostic test statistics. 
21
 We have experimented with system GMM regressions where, in addition to the fiscal balance and inflation, 
also banking sector size and/or capital account openness are considered predetermined. These regressions yield 
qualitatively similar but typically less precise estimates than those reported in Table 3, most probably due to 
problems of weak instruments and over-instrumentation. There is only so much endogeneity we can try to 
control for in our relatively small sample. 
22
 Usually difference-in-Hansen tests are used to check whether the additional moment conditions of system 
GMM compared to difference GMM (related to the differenced instruments in the level equation) are fulfilled. 
However, because the difference GMM estimations we present are only just identified, no such tests could be 
conducted. 
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Appendices  
 
Table A.1. Labels, definitions, sources and descriptive statistics of baseline variables 
 
Variable Label  Definition Source Period Obs. Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
Dependent         overall between within 
Local currency 
bond market 
(LCBM) 
capitalisation 
lc_mdebt_gdp Year-end outstanding local currency marketable central 
government debt (in % of GDP) 
OECD 2013 African Central 
Government Debt Statistical 
Yearbook (4th edition) 
2003-12 137 15.423 1.066 58.662 11.894 11.997 2.798 
Independent            
Total GDP ln_gdp_ppp Natural logarithm of GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) (in 
international dollar billions) 
IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) 
2002-11 150 3.413 1.201 6.324 1.208 1.223 0.230 
Area size ln_area Natural logarithm of surface area (in squared kilometres) World Bank African 
Development Indicators (ADI) 
2003-12 150 12.753 7.621 14.036 1.599 1.649 0 
GDP per capita ln_gdppc_ppp Natural logarithm of GDP per capita at PPP (in international 
dollars) 
WEO 2002-11 150 7.698 6.278 9.651 1.015 1.033 0.166 
Trade openness x_gdp Total exports of goods and services (in % of GDP) ADI 2002-11 150 35.523 8.648 86.018 16.516 16.401 4.478 
Domestic credit domcred_gdp Domestic credit to the private sector (in % of GDP) ADI 2002-11 150 28.553 2.181 167.536 36.540 37.130 6.311 
Fiscal balance av_fiscbal_gdp 3-year moving average of the general government fiscal 
balance, i.e., revenue minus total expenditure including the net 
acquisition of non-financial assets (in % of GDP) 
WEO 2002-11 150 -0.896 -9.581 13.507 4.493 3.422 3.031 
Inflation infl_cp Year-on-year change in annually averaged consumer price 
index (CPI) (in %) 
WEO 2002-11 150 10.095 -3.659 108.893 12.443 7.804 9.880 
Capital account 
openness 
kaopen Chinn-Ito coding of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions based on IMF Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 
Chinn-Ito KAOPEN database 2002-11 150 -0.281 -1.864 2.439 1.488 1.515 0.237 
Legal origins comlaw Dummy which equals 1 for countries with a British common 
law heritage and 0 otherwise  
Andrei Shleifer’s personal 
website: 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer 
2003-12 150 0.600 0 1 0.492 0.507 0 
Other 
government debt 
othdebt_gdp Complement of lc_mdebt_gdp: year-end outstanding (foreign 
and local currency) non-marketable and foreign currency 
marketable central government debt (in % of GDP) 
OECD 2013 African Central 
Government Debt Statistical 
Yearbook (4th edition) 
2003-12 124 30.843 0 139.192 32.245 19.133 26.116 
Institutional 
quality ICRG 
comprisk_icrg Unweigthed sum of normalised (0-to-1) scores on four ICRG 
political risk dimensions: ‘investment profile’, ‘law and order’, 
‘bureaucratic quality’ and ‘corruption’ 
Political Risk Services (PRS) 
Group International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
2002-11 140 1.887 1.003 2.646 0.321 0.314 0.103 
Democracy democ Polity IV institutionalised democracy index combining scores 
on ‘competitiveness of political participation, ‘openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment’ and ‘constraints on 
chief executive’ 
University of  Maryland Polity 
IV Project database 
2002-11 150 4.853 0 10 2.973 2.947 0.823 
VIX vix Yearly averaged Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Volatility Index measuring the implied volatility of S&P 500 
index options 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Federal Reserve Economic 
Data (FRED) 
2003-12 150 20.934 12.810 32.690 6.707 0 6.707 
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Table A.2. Robustness - FGLS/RE estimations 
 
 FGLS RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.ln_gdp_ppp -0.793+ -0.631 -1.124** -0.617 -0.409 -0.101 -0.903 -0.330 
 [0.540] [0.527] [0.573] [0.683] [1.665] [2.177] [1.187] [1.349] 
ln_area -3.938*** -4.043*** 1.713+ -3.206*** -4.171** -4.379* 3.645** -3.569** 
 [0.546] [0.542] [1.064] [0.594] [2.034] [2.321] [1.860] [1.739] 
L.ln_gdppc_ppp 1.117 1.689 -1.050 3.923*** 0.037 0.827 1.918 0.524 
 [1.330] [1.386] [0.892] [1.381] [3.109] [4.085] [2.171] [2.671] 
L.x_gdp 0.089** 0.088** 0.038 0.038 0.110 0.060 -0.031 0.098 
 [0.041] [0.043] [0.039] [0.039] [0.102] [0.131] [0.066] [0.102] 
L.domcred_gdp 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.107*** 0.043+ 0.053 -0.001 -0.037 0.027 
 [0.030] [0.030] [0.032] [0.032] [0.046] [0.053] [0.051] [0.055] 
L.av_fiscbal_gdp -0.166** -0.198*** -0.150** -0.115* -0.233** -0.286** -0.153+ -0.253** 
 [0.073] [0.076] [0.065] [0.064] [0.112] [0.136] [0.095] [0.119] 
L.infl_cp -0.035+ -0.043+ -0.038+ -0.029 -0.079** -0.083*** -0.060*** -0.080** 
 [0.027] [0.029] [0.025] [0.026] [0.033] [0.031] [0.019] [0.036] 
L.kaopen 0.006 -0.035 -1.225*** -0.171 -0.012 -0.416 -0.761 -0.195 
 [0.350] [0.339] [0.404] [0.303] [1.112] [1.261] [1.049] [1.138] 
comlaw 7.031*** 7.060*** 10.265*** 7.288*** 8.608** 9.103** 13.996*** 7.405** 
 [1.139] [1.097] [1.236] [1.130] [3.497] [4.203] [3.578] [2.943] 
othdebt_gdp  0.014    -0.005   
  [0.011]    [0.020]   
L.comprisk_icrg   3.364**    2.816+  
   [1.407]    [2.170]  
L.democ    1.208***    0.875* 
    [0.174]    [0.480] 
vix -0.032 -0.010 -0.030 -0.060** -0.036 -0.001 0.007 -0.039 
 [0.033] [0.034] [0.030] [0.030] [0.065] [0.063] [0.064] [0.065] 
constant 50.113*** 46.124*** -14.248 17.905+ 60.086+ 58.179 -58.807* 46.118+ 
 [11.600] [11.950] [16.437] [12.996] [39.615] [52.181] [34.220] [32.384] 
Observations 137 124 127 137 137 124 127 137 
Overall χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2     0.682 0.559 0.514 0.745 
Intra-class correlation ρ      0.738 0.833 0.887 0.712 
Breusch-Pagan p-value     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is lc_mdebt_gdp, year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt (% of GDP). Sample 
countries, years and independent variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. All independent variables are one-year lagged, 
except for ln_area, comlaw, othdebt_gdp and vix. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 
0.05; *p < 0.10; +p<0.20. 
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Table A.3. Robustness - POLS/FE estimations including bank lending spreads, interest 
rate variability and exchange rate variability 
 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
L.ln_gdp_ppp 0.147 -0.065 0.156 29.144 20.133 13.998 
 [0.967] [0.714] [0.946] [23.786] [26.004] [20.792] 
ln_area -3.611*** -3.397*** -3.630***    
 [0.681] [0.551] [0.660]    
L.ln_gdppc_ppp -1.508 -0.078 -1.501 -44.475 -29.048 -20.829 
 [2.462] [2.505] [2.290] [36.504] [38.808] [31.676] 
L.x_gdp 0.308*** 0.309** 0.309*** -0.010 -0.013 -0.002 
 [0.090] [0.125] [0.084] [0.060] [0.055] [0.057] 
L.domcred_gdp 0.168*** 0.140** 0.168*** -0.077* -0.094+ -0.095* 
 [0.045] [0.046] [0.043] [0.041] [0.055] [0.050] 
L.av_fiscbal_gdp -0.529*** -0.638*** -0.522*** -0.306** -0.202+ -0.186* 
 [0.152] [0.184] [0.147] [0.126] [0.145] [0.098] 
L.infl_cp -0.117 -0.157* -0.123** -0.049 -0.129+ -0.101* 
 [0.105] [0.074] [0.055] [0.053] [0.076] [0.055] 
L.kaopen 0.637 0.572 0.633 -0.672 -0.990 -1.181 
 [0.699] [0.710] [0.693] [1.269] [1.516] [1.479] 
comlaw 7.155*** 7.866*** 7.265***    
 [1.994] [2.329] [1.805]    
L.spread -0.009   -0.116**   
 [0.089]   [0.052]   
intvol  -0.382*   -0.036  
  [0.179]   [0.152]  
xrtvol   3.931   -6.145 
   [24.458]   [10.964] 
vix -0.073 -0.049 -0.072 0.042 0.019 0.026 
 [0.075] [0.078] [0.079] [0.055] [0.057] [0.054] 
constant 54.986** 42.836** 54.830*** 254.518 169.095 127.151 
 [19.039] [15.746] [17.751] [193.434] [201.507] [167.082] 
Observations 134 124 137 134 124 137 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2/R2-within (for FE) 0.847 0.848 0.850 0.257 0.208 0.209 
Intra-class correlation ρ     0.998 0.995 0.992 
Hausman p-value    0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is lc_mdebt_gdp, year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt (% of GDP). Sample 
countries, years and independent variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. All independent variables are one-year lagged, 
except for ln_area, comlaw, intvol, xrtvol and vix. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 
0.05; *p < 0.10; +p<0.20. 
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Table A.4. Robustness - POLS/FE estimations including HIPC completion point 
dummies and alternative sources of finance 
 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.ln_gdp_ppp 0.194 -2.258*** -0.164 -0.347 12.706 12.511 32.498+ -4.266 
 [0.945] [0.589] [0.640] [0.751] [20.483] [19.732] [22.019] [11.343] 
ln_area -3.599*** -3.800*** -3.174*** -3.010***     
 [0.671] [0.355] [0.594] [0.587]     
L.ln_gdppc_ppp -1.230 -7.512*** -0.265 -0.862 -18.633 -19.176 -47.040+ 11.071 
 [2.282] [1.869] [2.014] [2.492] [31.357] [30.367] [32.929] [17.220] 
L.x_gdp 0.305*** 0.350*** 0.302** 0.269*** 0.002 0.003 -0.056 -0.118+ 
 [0.084] [0.055] [0.115] [0.062] [0.055] [0.060] [0.077] [0.087] 
L.domcred_gdp 0.164*** 0.233*** 0.177*** 0.160*** -0.100* -0.094* -0.073+ -0.109* 
 [0.043] [0.032] [0.039] [0.047] [0.051] [0.048] [0.044] [0.058] 
L.av_fiscbal_gdp -0.562*** -0.711*** -0.641*** -0.409** -0.214* -0.205* -0.221+ -0.181* 
 [0.144] [0.134] [0.186] [0.141] [0.104] [0.096] [0.131] [0.088] 
L.infl_cp -0.125** -0.120*** -0.122* -0.030 -0.101* -0.100* -0.103* -0.088*** 
 [0.055] [0.034] [0.062] [0.028] [0.056] [0.054] [0.056] [0.027] 
L.kaopen 0.651 -0.139 0.609 0.130 -1.065 -1.267 -0.163 -0.361 
 [0.701] [0.317] [0.701] [0.578] [1.495] [1.557] [1.087] [1.015] 
comlaw 7.273*** 8.315*** 8.006*** 7.831***     
 [1.891] [0.977] [2.168] [1.784]     
hipc_cp -2.307    -0.944    
 [1.770]    [1.150]    
L.hipc_cp -0.146    0.104    
 [1.304]    [0.722]    
L2.hipc_cp 2.851**    1.054    
 [1.031]    [0.817]    
L.av_oda_gdp  -0.820***    -0.079   
  [0.155]    [0.147]   
fc_mdebt_gdp   -1.195**    -1.349  
   [0.459]    [1.689]  
fc_com_nmdebt_gdp    -0.244*    0.170** 
    [0.123]    [0.070] 
vix -0.091 0.026 -0.066 -0.057 0.015 0.026 -0.009 0.058 
 [0.080] [0.074] [0.079] [0.098] [0.053] [0.055] [0.048] [0.065] 
constant 52.896** 111.513*** 40.380** 43.770** 115.07 120.105 264.051+ -48.368 
 [17.786] [15.070] [14.218] [19.214] [165.746] [161.194] [172.486] [90.073] 
Observations 137 137 124 114 137 137 124 114 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2/R2-within (for FE) 0.854 0.901 0.861 0.821 0.217 0.210 0.264 0.290 
Intra-class correlation ρ      0.991 0.991 0.998 0.976 
Hausman p-value     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is lc_mdebt_gdp, year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt (% of GDP). Sample 
countries, years and independent variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. All independent variables are one-year lagged, 
except for ln_area, comlaw, fc_mdebt_gdp, fc_com_nmdebt_gdp and vix; hipc_cp is included together with its one- and two-year lags. 
Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p<0.20. 
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Table A.5. Dynamic panel results - difference GMM estimations 
 
 Difference GMM 
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) 
L.lc_mdebt_gdp 0.804*** 0.866*** 0.809*** 0.798*** 0.798*** 0.862*** 0.820*** 0.770*** 
 [0.179] [0.220] [0.204] [0.158] [0.181] [0.224] [0.207] [0.155] 
ln_gdp_ppp -1.237 -5.190 8.474 5.662 -0.749 -4.797 7.594 8.304 
 [22.897] [26.159] [18.205] [11.563] [23.150] [26.465] [18.842] [10.955] 
ln_area         
         
ln_gdppc_ppp 2.379 9.188 -10.889 -6.246 1.565 8.531 -9.410 -10.695 
 [31.460] [37.524] [24.771] [16.653] [31.921] [38.063] [25.631] [15.498] 
x_gdp 0.115 0.125 0.046 0.142 0.115 0.125 0.045 0.135 
 [0.129] [0.155] [0.106] [0.153] [0.129] [0.155] [0.108] [0.152] 
domcred_gdp -0.038 -0.043 -0.041 -0.060 -0.038 -0.042 -0.042 -0.055 
 [0.071] [0.080] [0.068] [0.064] [0.071] [0.080] [0.069] [0.063] 
av_fiscbal_gdp -0.429+ -0.471+ -0.035  -0.427+ -0.470+ -0.037  
 [0.265] [0.297] [0.132]  [0.266] [0.298] [0.129]  
infl_cp -0.210*** -0.127 -0.166** -0.135+ -0.210*** -0.128 -0.166** -0.138* 
 [0.065] [0.112] [0.074] [0.079] [0.065] [0.113] [0.075] [0.074] 
kaopen 0.518 0.391 0.655 -0.607 0.519 0.393 0.654 -0.480 
 [0.761] [0.804] [0.820] [0.948] [0.769] [0.812] [0.821] [0.963] 
comlaw         
         
vix 0.018 0.001 -0.001 -0.062 0.017 0.001 -0.001 -0.058 
 [0.072] [0.064] [0.077] [0.083] [0.073] [0.064] [0.078] [0.079] 
democ     0.103 0.077 -0.193 0.530 
     [0.452] [0.480] [0.309] [0.714] 
fiscbal_gdp    -0.335    -0.302 
    [0.252]    [0.240] 
constant         
         
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
# instruments 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(1)  p-value 0.021 0.047 0.016 0.015 0.022 0.050 0.017 0.011 
AR(2)  p-value 0.520 0.505 0.454 0.374 0.520 0.504 0.447 0.358 
Hansen p-value N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is lc_mdebt_gdp, year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt (% of GDP). Sample 
countries, years and independent variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported 
in brackets. Number of observations refers to number of data points in the transformed (first-differenced) equation. Number of instrument 
lags is limited to one and instrument matrix is collapsed. Columns (a): only av_fiscbal_gdp predetermined; columns (b): av_fiscbal_gdp and 
infl_cp predetermined; columns (c): av_fiscbal_gdp endogenous; columns (d): fiscbal_gdp endogenous. ‘N/A’ means statistic could not be 
calculated because specification is just identified. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p<0.20. 
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Figure A.1. Comparison of dependent variable of current paper with that of Mu et al. 
(2013) 
 
Notes: Straight line is 45° line. Data points for Mauritius are grey dots, for Sierra Leone grey triangles, and for Uganda grey diamonds. 
 
 
Figure A.2. Evolution of government LCBMs (as % of GDP) for sample countries, 2003-
2012 
 
Notes: For presentation purposes, only five largest LCBMs (relative to GDP) are shown separately. Range represents the minimum and 
maximum values of LCBM capitalisation for other ten sample countries: i.e., in descending order of relative LCBM size over 2003-2012, 
Zambia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Cameroon and Gabon. 
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Figure A.3. Evolution of government LCBMs (in nominal US$ billions) for sample 
countries, 2003-2012 
 
Notes: For presentation purposes, only four largest LCBMs (in absolute US$ terms) are shown separately. Range represents the minimum 
and maximum values of LCBM size for other eleven sample countries: i.e., in descending order of absolute LCBM size over 2003-2012, 
Mauritius, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, Uganda,  Malawi, Cameroon, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Gabon. 
 
 
Figure A.4. Evolution of government LCBMs (as % of total central government debt) 
for sample countries, 2003-2012 
 
Notes: For presentation purposes, only five largest LCBM shares of total central government debt are shown separately. Range represents the 
minimum and maximum values of LCBM shares of total debt for other nine sample countries: i.e., in descending order of LCBM shares over 
2003-2012, Zambia, Malawi, Uganda, Angola, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Mozambique and Gabon. Total central government 
debt is not available for Tanzania. 
South Africa
Nigeria
KenyaAngola
range of other (11) countries0
25
50
75
10
0
12
5
15
0
lo
ca
l c
u
rr
e
n
cy
 
m
a
rk
et
ab
le
 
go
ve
rn
m
e
n
t d
eb
t (U
S$
 
bi
llio
n
s)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
year
Mauritius
South Africa
Namibia
Nigeria
Kenya
range of other (9) countries
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
lo
ca
l c
u
rr
e
n
cy
 
m
a
rk
et
ab
le
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t d
eb
t (%
 
of
 
to
ta
l)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
year
39

 
Figure A.5. Bivariate scatter plots: government LCBM capitalisation vs. baseline explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Appendix Table A.1. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged, except for country size, common law dummy and other government debt. 
Lines represent best linear fit. Data points for South Africa are white dots, and for Mauritius grey dots. 
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Figure A.6. Evolution of non-marketable government debt and government LCBMs (as % of GDP) for HIPC completion point sample 
countries 
 
Notes: For presentation purposes, non-marketable government debt stock and LCBM capitalisation are only shown for five sample countries that reached HIPC completion point during 2003-2012: Madagascar (2004), 
Zambia (2005), Cameroon (2006), Malawi (2006) and Sierra Leone (2006). To facilitate comparison, evolution of  HIPCs’ debt stocks is shown in a five-year window centred around respective completion points. 
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